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Abstract: This paper exposes security vulnerabilities of the web based Open Source 
Information Systems (OSIS) from both system angle and human perspectives.It 
shows the extent of risk that can likely hinder adopting organization from attaining 
full intended benefits of using OSIS software. To undertake this study, a case study 
methodology was opted with fifteen public and private organizations being software 
companies and technology users. The respondents to this study were categorized as 
top management, software developers, systems administrators and end users. Apart 
from intensive documentary review, critical investigation of onsite servers running 
nine web based OSIS systems has been done. The studied systems are MOODLE, 
OrangeHRM, ATutor, Koha, WebERP, vTigerCRM, OpenDocMan, OpenSIS and 
Zalongwa software.The study reveals that there are security weaknesses in locally 
customized OSIS systems and freely downloadable information systems from 
internet repository.  This has been a result of uncoordinated operations and ad hoc 
performance of key OSIS stakeholders ranging from early stages of sourcing the 
said software, OSIS selection, adoption, customization, installation, upgrading and 
routine management.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Though application and use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 
is growing very fast in the world, in developing countries like Tanzania, the use and 
development of ICT capabilities is still limited and faces a wide range of constraints 
and challenges (Bakari, 2007). One example of the areas which demonstrates such 
ICT immobility in Tanzania is the use of web based Open Source Information 
Systems (OSIS). This has led to extensive Open Source Software (OSS) studies in 
recent years. As pointed out by Lungo and Kaasbøl (2006), there has been a 
growing interest among developing countries towards application of OSIS. In 
Tanzania for example, in the year 2003, the Government carried out participatory 
review of ICT which consequently resulted into National ICT Policy that places a 
considerable attention on the use of OSS products (URT, 2003).  
 
Since then, several initiatives have been taken to establish a benchmarking 
framework for utilizing this technology. In 2003, the Tanzania Free and Open 
Source Software Association (TAFOSSA) was established to act as a national 
umbrella with general objective of harnessing the potentials of free and open source 
software for supporting national developmental goals as spelled in Tanzania's 
National Vision 2025 and reiterated in Tanzania's National ICT Policy of 2003 
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aimed at advocating and promoting OSS for rapidly developing access to, and 
utilization of ICT in Tanzania. In fact, as highlighted by Mitchell (2004) the open 
source computing is an exclusive technology that has become an essential part of 
providing the fastest and most efficient organizational solutions in recent years. The 
organizations that take time to select, evaluate and apply OSS to their specific 
requirements are likely to realize widespread benefits that are immediate, ongoing 
and lasting.  
 
Considering that many government institutions are mainly financed by government 
and are by their very nature not-for-profit organizations, the logical course to take 
when it comes to choosing software is the OSIS solutions. In Tanzania for instance, 
the adoption of OSIS products by public sectors has been mainly motivated by its 
cost effectiveness and presence of National ICT Policy. On the other hand, since 
many private sectors receive limited software support, the driving factor for OSIS 
adoption is also based on the software cost. They opt for OSIS to gain business 
profit as they are either freely or cheaply available. 
 
The recent OSS studies conducted in Tanzania focused only on the experience in 
the usage and extent of investment. While this sort of technology is fast growing in 
the country and even in other developing countries, no research has been reported to 
find the best practices for secure adoption and use of OSIS systems. This has been 
due to the fact that many scholars who are proponents of OSIS systems rely on the 
assumption that OSS systems are designed with strong security and therefore not 
vulnerable to attackers and malicious hackers.  
 
However, from its very nature, the fact that OSIS systems are made available with 
open source codes and its development being fully depending on community 
support which is not guaranteed and which constitutes both good guys and bad 
guys; the OSIS turns to be of high potential risks from malicious attacks that can be 
introduced due to systems weaknesses and/or through deliberate and accidental 
actions by users.  
 
The security of these systems is a growing concern for adopters (Schneider, 2000). 
Security requirements are important to be met since failure to do so may expose 
critical organization’s assets specifically information to danger and become 
susceptible to disclosure risk and, hence, the objectives of organizations might be 
negatively affected as well. 
 
Therefore the goal of this study was to familiarize with the current applied methods 
as being practiced by various organizations in Tanzania for the adoption and use of 
OSIS and discloses the security vulnerabilities of the systems under production.  
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
To undertake this study, a case study methodology was used. As suggested by Yin 
(1994), a case study refers to an entity, unit of analysis or an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, using multiple 
sources of evidence with focus only on a particular issue. With this approach, the 
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problem can be understood and explored from its natural setting by answering 
“why” and “how” questions which are supportive in theory building research. 
 
 
Figure 1 lists the stages undergone during undertaking this study 
 
 
Figure 1: The OSIS Research Design 
 
As shown in Figure 1, the first stage of the study was to carry out extensive 
literature review on the subject; then we conducted interviews with the university 
academic tutors and professional staff in the field from the selected organizations 
and performed a deep screening of various running OSIS systems to identify their 
security vulnerabilities.  
 
 
Figure 2: The OSIS Organizations 
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Sample and Sampling Techniques 
To facilitate the interviewing of the selected respondents, four types of 
questionnaires were designed purposely for top management (TM), software 
developers (SD), systems administrators (SA) and end users (EU). The 
questionnaires formed the raw and primary data from multiple choice, open ended 
questions and face to face sessions with the use of both unstructured and semi-
structured.  
 
In average, each interview session lasted for approximately 40 minutes but 
interview with software developers and systems administrators took longer than 
that. This has been due to the fact that the software developers and systems 
administrators are the two technical groups of the subject under study which are 
highly involved in OSIS development, upgrading and patching and routine 
management. They are the only ones with access to source codes. 
 
The top management category involved senior level employees in the organization 
who assess new OSIS and have the final authority to decide whether a new 
technology will be adopted by the organization or not.  
 
The category of software developer involved OSIS software engineers who 
participate in software development project either in the systems designed from 
scratch or the one customized from free internet sources. The third category of the 
system administrators involved technical experts who deal with day to day 
management of OSIS systems. The end-user is defined as the final or ultimate user 
of OSIS. 
 
In undertaking this study, a total of 200 informants accessed 15 top managers, 24 
software developers, 41 OSIS administrators, and 120 end users. The educational 
qualifications of the respondents were ranging from PhD holders/lecturers (18), 
Masters/Assistant Lecturers (42), Bachelors/Tutorials Assistants/Advanced 
Diploma in IT (97) and lastly undergraduate students (43).  
 
Table 1: Academic Profile for Informants 
SN Qualification  TM SD SA EU 
1 PhD/Lecturers  11 1 - 6 
2 Masters/Assistant Lecturers 4 5 6 27 
3 Bachelors/Tutorial Assistants/Advanced Diploma in IT - 14 35 48 
4 Undergraduate Students - 4 - 39 
Total 15 24 41 120 
Total of 200 informants were interviewed at all sites 
 
A total of 15 public and private organizations were visited. Among which, 4 are the 
software companies while others are just OSIS technology users. As shown in Table 
2, in total, the 15 organizations consist of 52 different (i.e. 52 several versions based 
on 9OSIS systems) OSIS systems with organization Y having highest number of 10 
different OSIS running from production servers, followed by organization U with 9 
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OSIS software. The organizations K and R possess lowest number of OSIS. Each 
has just one OSIS system in use. 
 
Table 2:  Organizations, OSIS in Application and Average Years of 
Respondents 
SN Organization OSIS 
TM SD SA EU 







1 U 9 1 4 4 4 4 5 13 3 
2 V 5 1 3 5 6 5 6 17 3.5 
3 X 4 1 5 5 7 5 7 1 6 
4 W 2 1 1 - - 2 1 5 1 
5 Z 2 1 2 - - 2 2 9 1 
6 Y 10 1 10 10 8 5 6 5 7 
7 G 2 1 1 - - 2 1 5 1 
8 H 2 1 1 - - 1 1 3 2 
9 J 7 1 1 - - 5 3 21 2 
10 K 1 1 1 - - 1 1 6 1 
11 M 2 1 1 - - 1 1 5 1 
12 N 1 1 1 - - 1 1 8 1 
13 Q 2 1 1 - - 2 1 7 1 
14 R 1 1 2 - - 2 1 6 1 
15 I 2 1 1 - - 3 3 9 2 
Total/Average 52 15 2.33 24 6.25 41 2.67 120 2.43 
 
A group of software developers has shown to have more experiences in working 
with the OSIS systems with average of 6.25 years, followed by group of 
administrators (2.67 years), then end users (2.43 years). The top managers seem to 
have experience of average 2.33 years of working with OSIS systems. 
The visited organizations (U, V, X, W, Z, Y, G, H, J, K, M, N, Q and R) are 
purposely left anonymous as the consent to disclose identity was refused in order to 
protect business interests of such organizations. 
 
Onsite Practical Investigation of OSIS Software  
The security vulnerabilities of nine web based OSIS were examined. They include: 
(i) Human Resource Management Information System (HRMIS) – sample 
software is OrangeHRM-version 2.6.10. This is a PHP-based application for 
managing human resources. It was started in 2005 and the first beta release was 
made in January 2006. Due to online adoption, the software is continuously 
being improved through OSS community. 
 
(ii) Financial Management Information System (FINMIS) – sample software is 
webERP-version 4.0.9.1. This is an open-source web-based Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) system. It is an open source project and no fees associated with 
using the system. The WebERP has a wide variety of features suitable for 
managing even complex business processes such as multiple inventory locations, 
multiple currencies, lot and serial number tracking of inventory. All the features 
in webERP are integrated with each other and therefore inputs are required just 
once and everywhere the change is propagated across the system. 
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(iii) Document Management Information System (DocMIS) – sample software is 
OpenDocMan-version1.2.6.2. This is a free PHP web based Document 
Management System (DMS). It has automated document review process and 
automated file expiration process. Reviewer can approve or reject a new 
document or a changed document and e-mail notification options prior to and 
after a review. In this OSIS, it is possible to add any file type to the system and 
no File Transfer Protocol (FTP) required i.e. user can upload directly from the 
browser. 
 
(iv) Customer Relation Management Information System (CRM) – sample software 
is vtigerCRM-version5.4.0. This is an open source Customer Relation 
Management (CRM) that includes sales, service & marketing modules, and ERP 
modules for inventory and projects.  
 
(v) Student Management Information System (SMIS) – sample software are 
openSIS-version 4.2 and ZALONGWA. These are the student information 
systems developed and maintained by Open Solutions for Education (OS4Ed) 
and Zalongwa Technologies Ltd respectively. They are based in PHP and 




Figure 3: The Investigated OSIS Software 
 
(i) Library Management Information System (LIBMIS) – sample software is 
KOHA-version3.10.1. This is an Integrated Library System (ILS) that uses 
dual database design which utilizes the strengths of the two major industry-
standard database types (text-based and Relational Database Management 
Systems (RDBMS)). It is a web based and truly platform independent 
solution distributed under the open-source General Public License (GPL), 
hence no vendor lock-in. 
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(ii) Learning Management Information System (LMS) – sample software are 
MOODLE-version2.4.1 and ATutor-version2.0.3. These are the Open Source 
Web-based Learning Content Management System (LCMS) used to develop 
and deliver online courses. They are distributed under the terms of the GNU 
license. The acronym MOODLE is for Modular Object-Oriented Dynamic 
Learning Environment.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Driving Factor towards OSIS Adoption 
One of the aims of this study was to establish the motivation behind the adoption 
and use of OSIS systems by organizations in Tanzania. The study revealed that 
although the low Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) is a major driver for OSIS 
adoption among adopters, the results, however, suggest that this is not the only 
deciding factor. For instance, in implementing the project on financial management, 
the organization U purchased proprietary financial software called ACCPAC from 
CATS Tanzania Ltd contrary to its ICT policy which clearly advocates the OSIS 
usage.  
 
The ICT Security Trainings and Software Developments 
In this study, we sought to find out if the ICT security trainings are carried out and 
where the trainings are conducted, we evaluated its contents to determine whether it 
covers all aspects of ICT security. As part of observation of this study, it has been 
discovered that the trainings that are targeted to both technical and end users are 
either completely lack coverage in security or when the security is covered the 
contents reflect network security only. This has left out most of the OSIS 
programmers with less or completely lack of software security skills.  
 
One of the reasons that caused this to happen is the tendency of the systems 
administrators to relax as far as the functional requirements are met and the system 
is up and running. They do not keep track of further OSIS development, so in such 
situation, a move and migration to a new and more stable version is not guaranteed. 
We found that most of the installed OSIS are old, outdated and obsolete from 
security perspective; therefore they are susceptible to malicious attacks.  
 
Another security aspect is concerning with the OSIS accounts creation and 
password management among end users. Easy to guess and weak passwords have 
been common due to lack of security skills among end users. This create critical 
danger to systems, for instance, if hacker can guess a weak password created by less 
skilled user (“teacher”) in a MOODLE Learning Management System, hacker can 
then be able to acquire administrative privileges using the default settings and can 
do anything of interest in the system. So for the organizations which are using OSIS 
systems, the password management should be ensured up to the level of end users 
as hackers just need a single entry point to the system to gain administrative power. 
 
For some organizations which have developed their own OSIS from scratch using in 
house expertise, we found that they lack a best practice of the Many-Eye-Balls 
Phenomenon to give chance for security review of their written source codes. This 
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is an important aspect in OSIS security because software is released with source 
codes. 
 
The practice in some other organizations which opted to outsource their OSIS, have 
shown that vendors are granted administrative privileges even when the software is 
already in use and contain very sensitive information. This places a considerable 
potential risk to organization’s assets especially when vendors recruit cheap labors 
who work for them in a temporary basis.  
 
Due to existing technical gap between systems administrators and the software 
vendors, it has been discovered that some vendors tend to hide configuration tricks 
for various business reasons which left the systems administrator with little 
knowledge of what has been put within a system. So, if the vendor is not ethical, 
there is possibility of hacking and exploiting the system all the time after software 
delivery to the organization. This is possible through remote access by applying 
hidden authentication parameters. 
 
Another important security aspect that fall under software development is the 
security capacity and perception of local software vendors. Most of the local 
vendors consider security as an add-on feature. While they are designing the 
software on the first place, the emphasis is always given to the systems functionality 
and usability properties. The security requirements are only defined at a limited 
level of authentication where the focus is in usernames, passwords and access 
rights. However, since OSIS depend on mobile codes which are created by different 
authors being both ‘good guys’ and ‘badguys’, it becomes challenging for 
administrators to separate clean codes and be able to incorporate changes into the 
program. As a result, OSIS systems are left with many security flaws which can 
attract hackers. To wind up this discussion, the software development requires 
multidisciplinary skills from both software programming and software security. One 
of the causes of the existing technical gap between the security experts and software 
programmers has been due to the poor design of the computer science curricula 
where the security courses focus only on the network rather than software security. 
It should be clearly noted that in this new world of open source applications, 
network is not the only access hackers need to perform malicious activities. 
 
The Staff Ethics and Observance of Professional Codes of Conducts 
This aspect is of vital importance especially in the environment where the OSIS are 
alternative solutions. In that situation, organizations must be confident of the people 
who are managing the systems since these people are able to play with and 
manipulate the source codes and therefore can make the software misbehave in a 
certain period of time. The study revealed that people have been given systems to 
manage because of their ICT skills and ability and not because they are trusted. It 
has also been discovered that the seminars on staff ethics and professional codes of 
conducts are not practiced in most organizations. So, since the source codes are 
accessible by administrators, the organizations are uncertain whether the codes are 
manipulated or not. 
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Untrustworthy of OSIS Sources and Support 
From their very nature, the OSIS are publicly developed and therefore one OSIS 
can be available from multiple sources. It was the interest of this study to 
understand the capacity of the adopting organization in sourcing the OSIS software. 
It was however found that the organizations face difficult in finding the secured 
source of the OSIS software. The practice shows that the URLs (Uniform Resource 
Locators) are trusted, but who is to say that a certain website exists? Also 
organizations have no habit of checking the veracity of downloads. It is very 
possible to download a file named “webERP” assuming that it is financial system 
but in reality it is a malicious code.  
 
In addition to that, based on the fact that the OSIS software supports depend very 
much on the community which provide sources of the OSIS source codes that 
cannot be easily verified some systems administrators tend to find their own way to 
find solutions and support through public internet mailing lists. This creates the 
possibility of revealing organizational confidential information or receives support 
from both 'bad’ and ‘good guys’ that may introduce new security bugs. 
 
The Adoption of Immature OSIS Software by Organizations 
The study informs that 9 out of 15 visited organizations have attempted to download 
and customize the software which have not reached functional maturity stage. It was 
also discovered that 38 out of 52 downloaded OSIS systems were just provided as 
early versions released as technology previews, which are normally intended to 
experienced technically developed people for software testing and improvement. It 
has been difficult for the organization to measure fitness for purpose and 
interoperability of the OSIS software. For instance, the organization U which has 
already embarked on the use of OrangeHRM faces difficult to integrate it with its 
other information systems in the organization. The module that support software 
integration has closed source codes and therefore the implemented system is no 
more extensible and fail to retain the OSIS fundamental property of open source 
codes.One of the key lessons here is that the organizations opt to take advantages of 
readymade OSIS and therefore tend to skip significant software development stages 
which bring critical risks. 
 
The OSIS Accounts Management - Dead Link between Software Section, HR 
and User’s Departments 
This is the general problem observed from most visited organizations where the 
accounts management is treated in unprofessional way i.e. the requests, issuances 
and closing of OSIS accounts do not follow proper channel and in most cases is left 
as an individual task. The consequence of this is that; a staff continues to own 
username and password even if are already retired, transferred, changed job position 
or died. This is very dangerous act for information security in the organization. 
 
Organization’s Security Considerations 
Another facet studied during undertaking this study was the extent of security 
consideration in the signed contracts between organizations and their consulting 
firms. The results show that about 8 out of 11 screened Terms of References (ToRs) 
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in the legal contracts and Service Level Agreements (SLAs) for software acquisition 
and support do not include information security responsibilities. It was even 
difficult to site the word security in the sampled staff job descriptions of the visited 
organizations. All 15 organizations lack officer in charge of security.  However, 3 
organizations have employees with security expertise but their job descriptions do 
not reflect any security responsibilities.  
 
Technical OSIS Code Reviews and Systems Audit Logs + Data Auditing 
In this aspect, the interest was to observe whether organizations perform monitoring 
and evaluations of its systems and data. It was learnt that all 15 organizations lack 
procedures to review the source codes. So, the organizations are uncertain on 
whether the source codes are distorted for illegal purposes or not. However, it was 
noted from 17 systems administrators practice routine accounts status, privileges 
and access authorizations. The code reviews are totally left out. 
On the systems features, it was observed that apart from famous and publicly 
downloadable OSIS systems such as KOHA, OrangeHRM and MOODLE, other 
software which are either in house or locally developed lack audit logs which are 
vital in tracking each action performed by registered user in the system.  
Furthermore, most of the installed OSIS systems have quiescent documentation 
which does not accommodate any new configurations and code changes which 
happen regularly as a result of OSIS mobile codes. 
 
The OSIS Preconfigured Default Settings 
Normally OSIS comes with preconfigured default settings which must also be 
customized to suit both functional and security requirements. It was discovered that 
the systems administrators leave most of the default settings untouched. Through 
exploitation of these settings, hackers can easily get access into the system. 
 
Security Vulnerabilities of the acquired OSIS Systems by various 
Organizations in Tanzania 
The most common observed security vulnerabilities of the OSIS systems are Cross-
Site Scripting (XSS), security bypass, SQL Injection, Cross-Site Request Forgery 
(CSRF) and PHP Code Injection, Authorization Vulnerabilities and Arbitrary File 
Upload.  
 
Cross Site Scripting (XSS) Security Vulnerabilities 
We have found that in the orangeHRM, the public file jobs.php of recruitment 
module is exposed to provide unauthenticated attacker to gain administrative 
privileges. It has also been discovered in the Employee Social Service (ESS) 
module, user inputs are not sanitized in such a way that malicious ESS user can also 
gain administrative privileges. 
 
In some universities which are using MOODLE as their LMS, the MNET access 
control interface has a persistent XSS vulnerability which happens when server 
allows extended characters in usernames. This system has also XSS vulnerability in 
the fileblog/index.phpwhere some parameters are not being properly cleaned on the 
blog index page, allowing non-persistent XSS attacks. In the global search engine, 
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MOODLE has a reflexive XSS which is a problem in handling of user submitted 
data in global search forms. This problem is exploitable only when global search is 
enabled. However, by default the global search feature is disabled. When using a 
login-as feature in MOODLE, users may trick admins to edit some existing posts 
which contain XSS exploit code. Apart from MOODLE, another LMS called 
ATutor has multiple "cid" parameter XSS Vulnerabilities where the system fails to 
properly sanitize user-supplied input. 
 
On the other hand, the vTigerCRM allows XSS by modifying the parent tab URL 
parameter value when it is possible to include malicious JavaScript presented to the 
user. The locally developed Student Academic Register Information System 
(ZALONGWA-SARIS) seems to fail in validating user input where all sorts of 
chaos are possible if a user passes unexpected content to a PHP script. The system 
also fails to validate user inputs in the excel import facility which results into 
uploading ghost data. However, validation of user inputs through web forms is done 
through use of java scripts technology from the client side. 
 
Security Bypass Vulnerabilities 
In this type of vulnerability, the orangeHRM tends to allow users with 'ESS' 
privileges to view or modify Time Mod, Benefits Mod, Leave Mod, PIM Mod, or 
Admin Mod information. The MOODLE has a KSES1 Security Filter Bypassing 
vulnerability. This is a critical vulnerability in KSES text cleaning filter which may 
allow registered users to launch persistent XSS attacks. 
 
SQL Injection Vulnerabilities 
In the orangeHRM, the authenticated ESS users can perform SQL injection attacks, 
leads to unauthorized access to sensitive data, or arbitrary code execution. In 
WebERP, attacker can inject SQL codes when exploiting CSRF vulnerability 
especially when the HTTP requests are not filtered. In vtigerCRM, a malicious user 
may exploit this vulnerability to disclose potentially sensitive information or modify 
the underlying database. In MOODLE, data may be passed through 
add_to_log()function without being sanitized properly, this could allow SQL 
injection type attacks if there are any instances of wiki in the courses. ATutor 
allows 'links' blind SQL injection/admincredentials disclosurewhere remote 
attackers can inject arbitrary SQL statements into the statements used by the 
product through the use of the links parameter. 
 
The CSRF and PHP Code Injection Vulnerabilities 
The CSRF is a possibility of an attacker to add new administrator in the system. 
This happens in orangeHRM which does not have security measures implemented 
in the software against CSRF attacks. The remote attacker can trick an administrator 
to visit a malicious site; the attacker can perform privileged operations, or exploit 
PHP code injection vulnerability that can be found in the mail administration 
module. The successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities can lead to arbitrary 
code execution. 
                                               
1 KSES=”Kses Strips Evil Scripts” (HTML Filtering Mechanism) 
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The CSRF also happens in MOODLE Quiz reportswhere only limited validation is 
being done for one of the parameters, allowing unauthorized deletion of attempts in 
some instances. 
 
The Authorization Vulnerabilities 
The authorization vulnerability occurs in OrangeHRM in which the timesheet, 
attendance, HSP, recruitment, and leavemodulescontains bugs in the authorization 
code; from which the authenticated ESS users can access sensitive information, or 
perform privileged operations. 
The Local File Disclosure and Arbitrary File Upload Vulnerabilities 
The local file disclosure has been tested in the vTigerCRM in which the flaw is 
caused by lack of input validation of the file URL parameter when evaluated in the 
CommonAjax.php file. By modifying the file parameter path, and in turn 
terminating it with a NULL byte, it is possible to trick CommonAjax.php into 
including files which do not include ‘.php’ in the file name. 
In the same system, a malicious user can upload and execute malicious PHP files. 
The vtigerCRM has functionality to prevent users from uploading files with a 
“.php” extension but this restriction may be bypassed by uploading a file named in 
upper case such as SUPPLY.PHP or “.phtml” which is often associated (by 
default) with PHP files in many LAMP servers. This vulnerability also happens in 
KOHA and OpenSIS. 
The table 3 summarizes these security vulnerabilities against OSIS software. 
 
Table 3: Security Vulnerabilities against OSIS Systems 
 
SN Type of OSIS Security Vulnerability Observed in OSIS System  
1 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) OrangeHRM, MOODLE, ATutor, vTigerCRM, ZALONGWA 
2 Security bypass OrangeHRM, MOODLE 
3 SQL Injection MOODLE, ATutor, vTigerCRM, WebERP 
4 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) OrangeHRM, MOODLE 
5 PHP Code Injection OrangeHRM, MOODLE 
6 Authorization Vulnerabilities OrangeHRM 
7 Local File Disclosure and Arbitrary File Upload 




This study focused on the critical evaluation of the existing practices for OSIS 
adoption, customization and use by organizations. Despite the fact that the rate of 
investing in OSIS systems is increasing in Tanzania, no security measures are 
seriously taken to protect these systems. Organizations which have sourced their 
sensitive information in this kind of technology are exposed to high risks associated 
with poor OSIS configurations and customizations and/or deliberate and accidental 
actions by people which are a result of lack of strategies to guide the adoption and 
usage of web-enabled OSIS systems. This study reveals that although some 
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Tanzanian organizations have already invested in OSIS systems, there is a 
possibility of organizations to fail in attaining the intended benefits. 
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